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ABSTRACT 
For any non collegial voting game,cr, there exists a stability 
dimension v*(a), which can be readily computed. If the policy space 
has dimension no greater than v*(a) then no local a-cycles may exist, 
and under reasonable conditions, a a-core must exist. It is shown here, 
that there exists an open set of profiles, V, in the c1 topology on 
smooth profiles on a manifold W of dimension at least v*(a)+l, such that 
for each profile in v, there exist local a-cycles and no a-core. 
'' Thanks are due to Jeff Strnad, at the University of Southern 
California Law Center, for making available some of his unpublished 
work. The result presented here as Theorem 1 is much influenced 
by Strnad's work. 
THE GEOMETRY OF VOTING 
Norman Schofield 
Introduction 
Consider a spatial voting game,o, without vetoers on a topological 
space W of dimension w. Recent research has lead to results on the 
classification of any such game in terms of two integers: the stability 
and instability dimensions,v* (o) and w(o) respectively, where v* (o) < w(o). 
For a q-majori ty voting game, where q J:llayers out of n win, 
Greenberg (1979) showed that when W was convex compact of dimension 
w < q/n-q, and all individuals had convex preference then a core for 
the game was non empty. Strnad (1981,1982) essentially showed that 
for a general game a without vetoers that this result held as long as 
w _:".. v*(o) (for the q majority game v*(o) is the largest integer strictly 
less than q/n-q). Indeed for majority rule in general v*(o) = 1. 
Schofield (1983a,1983b) developed this further to show that with arbitrary 
smooth preferences and in dimension w _:".. v*(o), no local cycles for the 
game could occur. 
Greenberg also showed that if the dimension of W exceeded q/n-q 
then a smooth profile could be constructed such that no core existed. 
Strnad (1981,1982) showed that this was true for an arbitrary voting 
game a as long as dimension (W) .'.:_ v*(o) + 1. In this paper it is 
shown that in dimension v* (o) + l a  smooth profile can always be 
constructed so t11at the a-voting cycles fill the pareto set. 
Moreover the features that this profile possesses are unchanged 
under small perturbations in the c
1
-topology on all smooth profiles. 
We also show that if v*(o)+l _:".. w*(o)-1, then there is an open set 
in the c
1 topology on profiles, such that every profile in this set admits 
a non empty "local" a-core .. 
Statement of the Result 
We consider a voting game 0, defined in terms of a setiJ of winning 
coalitions. A coalition M is a subset of the society N {l, . . . ,n}. 
Suppose that u (u1
, . • . ,un) :W + lR
n 
is a continuous profile for the 
society, where W is a topological space of alternatives. 
Given a profile u, the preference correspondence P
i
: W  + W of player 
u
i 
(y) > ui (x). 
For a coalition M C N, let 
2 
i is defined by ycP
i 
(x) iff 
PM: W  + W be defined by PM(x) 
n 
ieMP i 
(x)' where � stands for the empty set. 
Write GO(M, { xGW: PM(x) �} . 
The preference correspondence of (0,u) is then P0:W + W where yeP0(x) 
iff ycoP
M
(x) for some Mt:£. Then the core or global optimum set of (o,u) 
is GO(o,u) = (} GO(M,u). MQ, 
Under certain conditions the core of (o,u) can be shown to be non empty 
for a certain class of profiles. For example let o(u) be the preference 
relation xo(u)y iff x�P0(x). 
Say there exists a a (u) -cycle through a point x E W iff there is 
a finite subset {x
1, . . . ,xr} 
xo ( u) x1 o ( u) • • • .  
in W such that 
o(u)x o(u)x. 
r 
In this case say x belongs to the global cycle set GC(o,u) of o(u). It is 
known that if u is continuous, and a(u) is acyclic (ie. r,c(cr,u) = <Ji), 
then GO(a,u) must be non empty. In general 
however it js not known that the preference relation a(u) is acyclic. 
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However Greenberg (1979) was able to show, with semi-convex preferences 
and certain constraints on the alternative space W, that GOp,u) would be 
non empty. Say a preference correspondence P:W + W is semi-convex iff 
W is a convex subset of euclidean space, and for no xi::in W, does xEConP(x), 
where ConP(x) is the convex hull in W of the set P(x). When W is a convex 
compact subset of lR
w 
say W is an admissible space of dimension w. 
Consider now a q-majority game a , whose set of winning coalitions 
q 
is given by £; 
q 
{MCN: IMI > q}. Greenberg showed that when W 
was admissible of dimension <q/n-q' and individual preference was 
semi convex as well as continuous, then the core GO(a ,u), of the 
q 
q-majority game was non empty. 
Recently Strnad (1981,1982) and Schofield (1983a) have extended 
this result to the general class of non-collegial voting games. 
Let j) by any family of subsets of N. The i::J -collegium C rf.) of � is 
defined by C (�) (\ M. 
MM 
If the family f.; of winning coalitions of the voting game,cr, is non empty 
then o is called collegial and the Nakamura (1978) number , v(a), of a 
is defined to be If o is not collegial then define the Nakamura 
number to be 
v(a) = min {l;il•I: 1'CI'_; and C(L'l <Ji}. 
Thus any subfamily .f.: ' of£ with at most v (a)-1 members must have 
4 
a non empty intersection (collegium), whereas it is always possible to find 
a subfamily with v(cr) members and empty collegium. 
For the game a, define the stability dimension v*(o) of a to be 
v*(o)- 2. It is an easy matter to show that for a q-majority game 
v*(a ) is the largest integer which is strictly less than q/n-q. 
q 
a 
q 
Strnad (1981,1982) has shown essentially, for continuous and semi-
convex individual preference, that if W is admissible of dimension 
w .'.:_ v*(a) then GO(a,u) must be non empty. Schofield (1983b) extended 
this result in order to show how to deal with non-convex but smooth 
preferences. 
Suppose now that W is a smooth manifold of dimension w. At any 
point x, the tangent space TxW is the space of tangent vectors at x. 
For 
an interior point x of W, T W may be identified with a copy of lRw with 
x 
origin O at x. For a boundary point x, Tx
W may be thought of as a half space 
{ v e F. w: v. n ( x) > o} 
where n(x) is the normal to the boundary pointing into W. When u. :W + lR 1. 
is the smooth utility function of player i, then H
i
(x) is the set of 
vectors {v6 T W: du. (x) (v) > O} where du. (x): T W + R is the differential 
x 1. 1. x 
of ui 
at x. We call Hi:W + TW the preference field of i, where 
TW U Tw. :xcw x 
In the case W is a subset of lR
w
, then H. may be regarded as a 
1. 
correspondence H. :W + JR w, and therefore as an approximation to the 1. 
preference correspondence P
i
:W + W. 
For coalition MC N, define H
M
:W + TW by H
M
(x) (\ H. (x) , and for a 1.C:M 1. 
voting game a define H0:W + TW by H0(x) 
U H (x). M&:: M 
Write IO (M, u) { X(::.W:HM(x) �} and define the infinitesimal 
optima set, IO(cr,u), of (cr,u) to be IO(cr,u) n IO(M,u) • �;£; 
Under the assumption that u is smooth, the preference field H :W + TW 
can be integrated in the following way. Suppose that, for coalition M, 
at some point .iew, HM(x) I- �. Then it is possible to construct a 
smooth path from x to some nearby point �W such that utility for each 
member of the coalition increases along the path. In this case we write 
5 
ye.P
M
(x). We also write ycr(u)x iff yeP
M
(x} for some ME::£. Under the definitions 
it follows that IO(M,u) { x<:W:y£P
M
(x) for no yE W} 
IO(cr ,u) { xeW:ycr(u)x for no y c w}. 
Moreover it is the case that for any x,y�w. y<::P
M
(x) implies that y<:,P
M
(x). 
Thus 
GO(M,u) C IO(M,u) 
and GO(cr,u) c_ IO(cr,u). 
(See Schofield, 1980, for further details). 
Suppose now that Wis convex subset of lR.w. Say that i has convex preference 
iff for each xeW, it is the case that Pi(x) C { �W: dui(x) (y-x) > O}. 
With convex preference the global and infinitesimal optima sets will 
be identical. 
In a number of papers Schofield (1978,1980) has examined a set of 
"local voting cycles". 
More specifically for a voting game cr, and smooth profile u, 
say that a point x belongs to the local cycle set LC(cr,u) iff for any 
neighbourhood U of x there is a finite subset { x1, • • .  ,xr} in W such that 
6 
xcr (u) x1 a (u) a (u) xrcr (u) x, 
and this voting trajectory belongs to u. 
For the profile u, let p
i 
(x) be the direction gradient of u
i 
at x (i. e. pi(x) is a vector at the point x, normal to the indifference 
surface u. -1[u. (x)] in the direction of increasing utility) . For coalition 1 1 
M, let pM(x) be the convex hull of pi
(x). 
Given a , let /J (x) { Mc.£ :HM(x) t- �}. 
Define the directional core at x to be 
p0(x) 
(\ 
Me,.C (x) PM (x) ' 
and define the infinitesimal cycle set of (cr,u) to be 
IC(cr,u) { xew: p0(x) = �}. 
It was shown in Schofield (1978) that, for any point in the interior of W, 
if p
0
(x) = � then xeLc(cr,u). Moreover if, for every xew,p0(x) t- � 
then LC(cr ,u) �(Schofield, 1983c). 
Suppose now that W is a smooth manifold of dimension w .::_ v*(cr), and 
choose any point x in W. Suppose of)' is a subfamily of .S (x) of 
cardinality at most v*(cr)+l. Since the cardinality of £)• is less than the 
Nakamura number v*(cr)+2, this implies there exists some individual belonging 
to C�' ). 
Thus p
i 
(x)e M�
' PM
�x) I- �. 
Since the dimension of W is no greater than v*(cr), and each pM(x) 
is a convex compact set, Helly' s Theorem implies that 
pcr(x) 
n 
Mc;.G(x)
p
M(x) t- �. 
(See Schofield, 1983a, for further details) • 
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When W is admissible and u is a smooth profile then IC(o,u) = <I> 
implies IO(cr,u) must be non empty (Schofield l983b). 
Thus when W is admissible of dimension < v*(o) then IC(cr,u) and thus 
LC(o,u), must be empty. As a consequence IO(cr,u) must be non empty. 
If we suppose further that preferences are convex, then GO(o,u) must be 
non empty. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the dimensionality 
constraint is necessary, as well as sufficient for the non existence of 
local cycles. We prove the following result in the next section of this 
paper. 
Theorem l 
Suppose that a is a voting game and W is a smooth manifold of dimension 
w > v*(o)+l. Then there exists a smooth profile u 
such that LC(o,u) is non empty. 
Existence of Cycles 
Proof of Theorem l 
Cu1
, . . .  ,unl :W ->- JR 
n 
By the definition of the Nakamura number there exists a subfamily.&' 
of.}) with cardinality v* (a) +2 such that the collegium of/)• is empty. 
Let l1 be the abstract simplex in JR w of dimension v* (o) +l. A face 
F. of this simplex is a subsimplex of dimension v*(o), and can be 
J 
identified with the convex hull of v*(o)+l vertices. All together 
there are v*(o)+2 faces, and we identify each face F. with a coalition M. 
J J 
in /;•. 
For each ii:N, let j)i 
of coalitions including i. 
= {M.E.£'1:i£ M.} 
J J 
be the subfamily of j) ' 
Let T = {ieN: f:if' ¢}. 
For each if:. T, i cannot belong to every member of if, ' since c (;&') <!>. 
Thus l < \l. \ < ]. - v* (o) +l. 
Since t; is a simplex, any family of at most v*(o)+l faces has a non empty 
intersection. 
Let S. ]. 
,!\ 
F jCk . j "  ]. 
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Now Si 
is a subsimplex of l1 of dimension at most v* (o). If S. is a vertex ]. 
( an O-dimensional subsimplex) define v
i 
s . .  ]. 
Ifs. has dimension (S.) > l then define the interior of S. to be the set ]. ]. - ]. 
of points in Si 
but in no subsimplex (of dimension strictly less than 
dirn(S.)) . ]. 
S . •  ]. 
In this case define vi 
to be some point in the interior of 
By this definition, if ie T, then v.ISF. for any F. such that iGM . • ]. J J J 
Let t;' be the simplex generated by the vertices {vi:iG
T}. 
For each coalition M. G/J' , let p be the convex hull of { v. : i e M.}. J Mj 
i J 
By definition p C F . •  M
j J 
Now let e be the barycentre of the simplex t;•, and for each iE T, let 
p. be the vector from e to the vertex v . •  ]. ]. 
Note that for each M. 6 j;, ' J 
the vectors {p. : i 6 M.} are not semiposi tively dependent ]. J 
(i. e. it is 
impossible to find non negative numbers {;l,. IE JR :  i e M. } such that ]. J 
I t..p. = 0). Thus for no M. E: ,j) I does e belong top • 
]. ].  J � 
By definition, the family {F.:j=l, • • •  ,v*(o)+2} of faces has empty intersection, J 
and thus 
Po 
:;; 
PMj 
has empty intersection. 
Now let x be a point in the interior of the manifold w. For each 
i c= T, define the vector p. (x) e lR w to be the vector p. as defined above. i i 
It is then possible to define ui:W + lR such that with respect to some 
coordinate chart at x, the direction gradient of ui at x can be identified 
with pi (x). For each ie N,T, define u. to be the constant function on w. i 
It is well known (Smale 1974) that at a point x in the interior of '.�, 
then HM(x) = � for coalition M iff {pi(x) :iE M} are semipositively 
dependent. 
By the construction above, for each M. € ,G• ,HM (x) t- �. J j 
Thus pcr(x) = r. PM. = ,(J.) PM = �. J 
Hence x�IC(cr,u). But by the construction x is an interior point of 
W and u is a smooth profile. 
Thus xE-LC(cr,u) and so LC(a.u) is non empty. 
• 
The proof procedure presented here is adapted from Strnad's 
construction of a smooth profile with empty global optima set. 
More specifically Strnad assUilles that W is admissible of dimension 
v*(a)+l. Call 6' the a-simplex: since this simplex is of dimension 
at most v*(cr)+l, it can be embedded in W, with the barycentre e 
corresponding to point xew. 
To each i e T, assign the smooth "euclidean" utility function 
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ui:W + lR to i by ui 
(x) - llx-vi ll ·Thus ui has a maximum point at the 
vertex vi, and at any other point x, pi(x) 
A(v.-xl where A > o. i 
For each ;i4T assign a constant utility function. Let�' be as in the 
proof of the theorem. Then for each M.�.i& · it is the case that 
J 
IO(M.,u) is the convex hull of {v.:i6M. }, and can be identified 
J i J 
with the convex set p • M
j 
Moreover 
IO(a,u) 
Thus IO(a,u) is empty. 
(\ IO(M,u) C.. 0 PM . MCp � J 
�. 
Furthermore each utility function defines a convex preference, and so 
for each Me £ , IO (M, u) GO(M,u). Thus GO(cr,u) is empty. 
Note also that at the point x located at the barycentre of the 
a-simplex the analysis in the proof of Theore�n l 
say that pa(x) = � and so x0IC{cr,u). 
is valid. That is to 
Indeed it should be clear that with this "euclidean" profile, 
there exists an open dense set X in the interior of the a-simplex such 
that any point in X also belongs to IC(cr,u). 
Note also that the a-simplex corresponds to the optima set 
IO(N,u) GO(N,u) for the whole society N. 
Thus Strnad's method shows that IC(cr,u) is open dense in 
IO(N,u), so that the closure of IC(a ,u) includes IO{N,u). 
Suppose now that dimension (W) = v*(cr)+l. In this case 
Schofield (l983a, Theorem l) has shown that IC(cr,u) C IO(N,u). 
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In dimension v*(cr)+l we therefore see that closure(IC{cr,u)) IO(N,u). 
The proof of Theorem 1 relies heavily on the fact that the 
v*(a)+2 distinct faces, of a simplex of dimension v*(cr)+l, do not 
intersect. Notice however that any v*(o)+l distinct faces do 
intersect. Suppose now that we project the simplex onto the 
v*(o)-dimensional plane. Then by Helly's Theorem the projections 
of the v*(o)+2 faces will intersect. This is the essence of the proof 
that there can be no local cycles in dimension at most v*(o). 
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To give an example of the construction in Theorem 1, consider a weighted 
voting game o with four players, N { a,b,c,d }, where the winning 
coalitions are {a,b} { a,c},{ a,d}, {b,c,d}. 
Clearly v(o) = 3, or v*(o) = 1, since £;• { { a,b},{a,c},{b,c,d}} 
has empty collegium. Let n be the two dimension simplex, whose 
three faces correspond to these three coalitions. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]. 
The three vertices are identified with the players {a,b,c} and the 
fourth player with a point in the bottom face. The four vectors 
{pa,pb,pc
,pd
} are thus semipositively dependent. Consequently if 
utility functions are assigned to these players on a two dimensional 
space W such that at a point x, the direction gradients of the players 
are given by these vectors, then the point itself belongs to the pareto 
set IO(N,u) as well as the cycle set IC(o,u). 
Theorem 1 can be strengthened somewhat. 
Note that the vectors {p
i(x): i6 N} may be pe
rturbed slightly from the 
assigned values and yet still give an empty directional core at x, and thus 
a non empty cycle set. 
Let U(W)
N 
be the set of smooth utility profiles. We endow 
U(W)N with the Whitney c
1
-topology. In this topology a neighbourhood 
N(u,6) of the profile u includes any profile veU(W)N such that for all 
xew and all ieN, 
\ u
i 
(x) - vi {x) \ < o and \ dui (x)-dvi (x) \ < 6· 
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Clearly the profile u constructed in the proof of theorem 1 has a neighbourhood 
N(u,6) such that IC(o,u') = ¢ for all u'e N(u,6). Thus we obtain: 
Theorem 2 
Let 0 be a voting game and W a smooth compact manifold of 
dimension w > v*(o)+l. 
a) Then there exists an open neighbourhood V in the Whitney 
1 N 
C -topology for U(W) such that IC(0,u) �¢for all u�V. 
b) Moreover if W is a smooth compact convex manifold in lR
w 
of dimension 
w > v*(0)+1 then (a) can be strengthened to read 
I0(0,u) =¢for all ucV. 
Let us now define 
• N 
1- <ol = {ucU(W) :IO(o,u) =¢and IC(o,u) � ¢}· 
Clearly theorem 2 implies that, for a smooth admissible manifold,,( (0) 
has a non empty interior in U(W)
N, as long as dimension (W) > v*(ol+l. 
In an earlier paper (Schofield 1980) it was shown that for each non-
collegial voting game there is an integer w*(o) such that when dimension 
(W) > w*{o) then ,,;(,(o) is open dense in U(W)
N. Indeed for each 
• 
uG�(o) in this dimension range IC(o,u) was shown to be open dense 
in W. 
Now define K (CJ) {u t:U(W)
N:IO(CJ,u) of- <!> and IC(o,u) <!>} . 
The earlier result implied that K(CJ) had empty interior if dimension 
(W) > w* (CJ). 
We may now show, in dimension v*(CJ)+l, that K(CJ) has a non empty 
interior. 
To see this consider again the four person voting game in two 
dimensions considered above. From previous analysis it is easy 
to show that w*(CJ) 3. Suppose now that the profile u is such 
that player a has a bliss point at x, and the direction gradients 
of the other players are semipositively dependent. See Figure 2 .  
[Insert Figure 2 about here]. 
Consequently x t:,IO(CJ,u). Moreover it is easy to construct a profile 
u such that IC (o, u) ¢ (for example take linear utilities for 
the players {b,c,d}). 
Moreover the profile may be perturbed slightly in the c1-topology, 
yet still retain these properties. It should be clear that we may 
construct a profile u in general in this way in dimension v*(CJ)+l 
J3 
such that IO(CJ,u) � ¢. (See also Cox, 1983). Thus we obtain the following. 
Theorem 3 
Let a be a voting game and W a smooth manifold of dimension v*(CJ)+l . 
If v*(CJ)+l .'.'.. w*(CJ)-1, then there exists an open neighbourhood U in the 
1 N C -topology for U (W) such that IO (CJ, u) t <1' and IC (o, u) = cp for all 
u E- u. 
Conc lusion 
The results presented here imply that a voting game CJ can be classified 
in the following way. 
The stability dimension v*(o) is the smallest integer such that dimension 
(W) .."._ v* (CJ) +l implies that the set �(CJ), of smooth profiles sustaining a 
cycle set, hds non empty interior in the space U(W)N with the Whitney 
c1-topo logy. In dimension v*(CJ)+l, the cycle set associated with any profile 
must be paretian. 
Consider now the instability dimension w(CJ). It has been shown that in 
dimension at least w(o)+l, there is a dense set V' in U(W)N such that IO(CJ,u) 
and IC(o,u) t <1' for all u�V'. Indeed it was shown that IC(CJ,u) would be 
dense in W, for all u � V'. 
Consequently in this dimension range the set K(o) of profiles, sustaining 
a CJ-core, must have empty interior. Moreover if W has no boundary, but is 
of dimension w(o), then K(CJ) must have empty interior. 
Thus w (o) may be characterised to be the greatest integer such that if 
W is a smooth manifold of dimension w, then w < w(o)-1 implies that K(CJ) has 
a non empty interior . At present upper bounds on w(CJ) are known to be (n-1) 
for a general non collegial game, q for a q-majority game, and 3 or 4 for 
strict majority rule. As Theorems 2 and 3 show, when the dimension range 
14 
[v*(o)+l,w(o)-1] is non empty, then bothl(o) and K(CJ) have non empty interior. 
<1' 
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Figure 1: A point x in the cycle set IC(cr,u) in a two dimension space 
for voting game a with players {a,b,c,d}, before and after 
perturbation. 
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Figure 2: A po int x in
 the optima set IO(cr,u) 
in a two dimension space
 
for the voting game cr wi
th players {a,b,c;a}b
efore and after 
perturbation. 
